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ARTICLES

INTRODUCTION TO THE COMPACT WITH THE
PEOPLE
Rev. Paul J. Goda, S.J.*
As Chair of the steering committee for the Institute on the
Bicentennial of the United States Constitution at Santa Clara University from January to March, 1987, it is with some pride that I
write this introduction to the publication of Congressman Peter W.
Rodino's speech. The steering committee established the following
purpose for the Institute:
This year's Institute is an educational endeavor celebrating the
Bicentennial of the U.S. Constitution. Our intention is not just
to look backward in commemoration but to help others - our
students in particular - to look forward. Our challenge is to
analyze how our government works, to realize the moral implications of the national community we have formed.
We tried to fulfill this challenge to ourselves by getting authoritative and provocative speakers with different points of view. Arthur
Schlesinger, Jr. was matched with Professor James Q. Wilson. Both
asked how a government formed 200 years ago could last into a
vastly different world. Mr. Michael Novak and Dr. Mary Frances
Berry emphasized seemingly contradictory arenas of our national
existence. Mr. Novak showed how the Constitution nourished the
creative need to protect and vitalize the economic structures of our
society. Dr. Berry described our failures and our possibilities in our
attempts to protect and engender civil rights.
Finally, we were fortunate in obtaining Congressman Rodino's
assent to speak at the Institute. Congressman Rodino will not be an
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unknown to history. His twenty terms, so far, in the House of Representatives and his service on the House Judiciary Committee at
times of constitutional crisis, entitle him to public honor. But it is for
his integrity and kindness and wisdom that we praise him.
I would like to believe that someone will do research at the tricentennial or quadricentennial celebration of the Constitution and
find Congressman Rodino's lecture printed here in a copy of the
Santa Clara Law Review. That unknown person 100 or 200 years
from now will read in this speech something which goes beyond the
technical analysis of the law which usually finds its way into the dry
pages of our law journals. That person will find in Congressman
Rodino's words a living hope in the principles of our government,
not just the principles of political science, such as the separation of
powers, but also the human capacity for justice and trust.
When I asked that this lecture be printed in the Law Review, I
realized that portions of it are partisan. One of the Law Review editors quite properly objected that the Law Review is not meant to be a
forum for partisan opinion. I have no quarrel with that, but I
suggested that Congressman Rodino focused on an approach to the
Constitution that we must all share, whatever our political persuasion. The Compact With the People must be based on a covenant of
trust under which we can rule ourselves.
There is no doubt that the separation of powers is built on a
carefully cynical view of the weakness of humanity. The Constitution, like any frame of government, must give protection against
misuse of power. But having said that, we must still build the everyday structures of government on a foundation of trust by which we
live together without continual stress and hatred.
All of our lectures fulfilled our purpose "to realize the moral
implications of the national community we have formed." Congressman Rodino's speech exemplified that purpose by his own personal
history, by his position of power, and by his subject matter. We were
grateful for his presence, and hand his words on to our posterity. In
our time, we are the posterity of the framers of the Constitution who
must hand on to another generation what the preamble of the Constitution transmitted to us as a challenge . . ..

THE COMPACT WITH THE PEOPLE*
Representative Peter W. Rodino, Jr.**
When 55 delegates assembled in Philadelphia 200 years ago,
they had no intention of producing a new constitutional document.
They met to revise the Articles of Confederation, which had proven
woefully inadequate in holding together thirteen small but fiercely
independent republics. But their revision efforts never materialized.
Instead, during a ferociously hot Philadelphia summer, stormy
debates ensued that reopened the question of just what the "grand
experiment" of '76 was supposed to produce in practice. It was a
difficult period of self-examination, a third of the delegates simply
gave up and returned home. Only the moral force of Washington,
sitting as Chairman, and Franklin, as the house elder, held the remaining delegates together so that essential compromises could be
reached. The "127-day ordeal", as Madison later referred to it, ended with agreements on a four-page, handwritten document that
changed the course of world history forever.
If ever a joyous celebration was in order to commemorate what
free men can achieve, the Bicentennial of our Constitution is such an
event. But for a number of reasons, this anniversary is a time of
serious reflection and thoughtful observance - much more so than
perhaps either the 200th birthday of the Declaration of Independence in 1976, or the centennial of the Statue of Liberty last year.
An unusual array of constitutional stresses and strains have surfaced in the past few years and now engage the country's attention.
Foremost among them are the issues brought to the fore by the Iran
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arms affair, which cut to the heart of the workings of our constitutional system. When laws are broken or conveniently ignored, when
the people and their elected representatives are bypassed in the information process, when covert actions replace regular foreign policy
making channels, then the responsible parties - no matter who they
are - must be held accountable to the sovereign people under the
laws of the land.
But there are also other assaults on the basic framework of the
document we honor this year, there are those who now urge that
constitutional issues be judged solely by the framers' "original
intent", who question whether the Supreme Court's decisions really
constitute the law of the land and who question the application of
the Bill of Rights to citizens affected by state actions. Equally pressing is the question of whether we in government are really fulfilling
our responsibility to provide for the "general welfare" and the
"blessings of liberty" for all Americans and all posterity, as pledged
by the framers.
Taken together, these challenges raise the question for some of
whether the Constitution - for all its flexibility and strength - is
capable of meeting the demands of the modern era. Others wonder
about the system's capacity for self-correction.
In reflecting on these questions, I find myself - as I have so
many times over the past years - returning to the preamble:
We the people of the United States in order to form a more
perfect union, establish justice, insure domestic tranquility, provide for the common defense, promote the general welfare, and
secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity, do
ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of
America.
In this single paragraph, the framers succeeded in establishing
the democratic framework of our new republic. It was to be a government as concerned about the general welfare of its people as
about the common defense. It was to be a government dedicated to
bringing justice and the blessings of liberty not to just one class or
group, but to all the people - and not just for the present, but for
our posterity.
But the vision and promise of the new republic was not immediately apparent to all the assembled delegates at the Constitutional
Convention in 1787. The proceedings reveal that the precise phrasing, syntax and form of the preamble underwent more drafts and
revisions than some of the very detailed articles that follow. Thus, on
August 6, 1787, we do not find the familiar phrase "We the people
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of the United States" in the draft ordered reported by the Committee
on Style. Instead, the preamble contained a formal, almost legalistic,
statement of intent, resembling more the language of a negotiated
"treaty" among thirteen sovereign states than a unifying document of
cherished principles. The early draft begins: "We the people of the
[following enumerated states] establish the following constitution for
the government [of the United States"].
Three weeks later, the draft was referred to the Committee of
Five, comprised of Doctor Johnson, Alexander Hamilton,
Gouverneur Morris, James Madison and Rufus King. For six days,
the Committee physically withdrew from the assembly, finally
returning to the hall with a brand new version. A remarkable transformation had occurred. No longer did the preamble narrowly refer
to the people as only citizens of the "following enumerated states."
Instead, the preamble spoke of "We the people of the United States
in order to form a more perfect union." No longer did the preamble
contain a "utilitarian" statement of intent, whose unconcealed purpose was to diffuse tensions among the states. The preamble now
expounded the very reasons for government. Such a pronouncement,
impossible at the beginning of the convention, was accepted without
question at its end.
As I have thought of this history, I continue to marvel at two
aspects of the final language adopted by the founding fathers. The
first is that balance - a kind of dynamic equilibrium - is the hallmark of the "more perfect union" sought by our founding fathers.
Once liberated from purely parochial concerns, they devoted themselves to the multiple, overlapping goals inherent in a free society:
"to establish justice, insure domestic tranquility, provide for the
common defense, promote the general welfare . . ."
All of these avowed purposes for forming the new republic must
necessarily dovetail if the system is to work. How can there be
national security - a "Fortress America" - if, at the same time we
are "providing for the common defense," the American dream is
redefined to exclude education, health care or economic productivity.
As Madison made clear in the FederalistPapers, there are diverse
elements of the public good, and the achievement of any government
is its success "in mingling them in their due proportions."
The second aspect of the preamble by which I am struck is the
unmistakable presence of a covenant of trust: "We the people of the
United States in order to form a more perfect union . . ." These are
words of a compact being entered into - a social compact between
the people and each other, and the government. Any breach of that
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covenant threatens the very foundation of our democracy. In this
time of public questioning of the institutions of government, the
social compact with the people is severely strained. The American
people have many unanswered questions about the administration's
adherence to the laws, the disparity between its public statements
and private actions. We have learned from the recent past that these
crises of public confidence are not unique to our times. But just as
was done in the past in each prior instance, we have openly confronted the crisis by reliance on the rule of law. We can do no less at
this moment.
I submit that the Constitution provides the self-correcting forces
to restore both equilibrium and trust. In light of some recent events,
tonight I particularly want to focus on two such balancing mechanisms - due process of law and separation of powers. I then want
to examine the current state of the social compact, 200 years after its
inception.
Even before it was written into the Constitution, the phrase
"due process of law" had a long history. In the American experience, the phrase first appeared in the act of 1692 of the General
Court of Massachusetts Bay. Before that, it was found in an Act of
Parliament adopted in 1355 during the reign of Edward III. But the
idea behind "due process of law" - that government authority
should never be placed above fundamental law - reaches back in
time even further. It is really a paraphrase of the words "the law of
the land," which the embattled barons, ecclesiastics and burghers
compelled King John to acknowledge in a historic meadow in
Runnymeade in 1215. Even Aristotle, twenty-three centuries ago,
envisioned the concept when he said, "[riulers ought to be governed
by principles of rational generality. . . . [t]he laws should be the
rulers."
The concept was immediately embraced at the federal level of
our government. Unfortunately, the guarantees of due process were
slow to be acknowledged, let alone safeguarded;, in state actions.
Finally, in the wake of the Civil War, the fourteenth amendment
filled that vacuum on the books - but not necessarily in practice.
For the next hundred years, voting rights, the right to be admitted
into state educational institutions or the right to qualify for state licenses or other franchises were often subject to arbitrary treatment
for some segments of the population.
Given this history, it is highly disconcerting - just as the
bicentennial anniversary begins - to hear the chief law enforcement
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official of the land advocate a wholesale retrenchment from the guarantees of fair treatment and open access to our institutions of
government that are guaranteed by the due process precept. The Attorney General unabashedly seeks to cut back on many due process
protections by utilizing what he terms a "jurisprudence of original
intention." This ponderous sounding doctrine advocates a return to
pre-Civil War days when state governments were not held to the test
of guaranteeing the freedoms contained in the Bill of Rights. It
maintains that at the moment of conception, the Bill of Rights applied only to the federal government, and thus it was the founding
fathers' clear and irrevocable intention not to expand these liberties
to citizens affected by the actions of state governments.
This discredited doctrine is not new, and unfortunately, carries
the echoes of the very reasoning applied by Justice Taney in the
1857 Dred Scott decision. In that case, Chief Justice Taney, in
striking down the Missouri Compromise of 1820 as unconstitutional,
offered the view that blacks were not persons entitled to citizenship
under the Constitution because the original intent of the framers was
to conceive of slaves as property. Taney's words are remarkably similar to those contained in many of the Attorney General's recent
speeches:
The Constitution must be construed now as it was understood
at the time of adoption. It is not only the same words, but the
same in meaning . . . and as long as it continues to exist in its
present form, it speaks . . . with [the] same meaning and intent
as when it came from the hands of the framers. ...
Interestingly, the proponents of this revisionist line of thought
choose to ignore the writings and lives of the framers themselves.
Madison, the principal author of the document, never subscribed to
this notion. He was unabashed in drawing attention to the fact that
he initially opposed the establishment of the first Bank of the United
States as being unconstitutional, and then twenty years later, enthusiastically approved the creation of a second Bank. The constitutional
text hadn't changed, he later explained, but a "construction [had
been] put in the Constitution by the Nation which, having made it,
had the supreme right to declare its meaning." He continued,
"whatever veneration might be entertained for the body of men who
formed the Constitution, the sense of that body could never be
regarded as the oracular guide in expounding the Constitution . . .
it was nothing but a dead letter, until life and validity was breathed
into it by the people. .. .
I must agree with Madison. The Constitution is a design for
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governing, not a static or exhaustive recitation of the relationship
between the state and the individual as found in the civil codes of
Europe. It lays out the federal architecture for maintaining a delicate
balance of forces; but as a political document, it is purposely general,
almost minimalist in its mode of expression and explanation. This is
particularly true with respect to the notion underlying due process
protections. Chief Justice Hughes succinctly explained that the
framers "did not attempt to define the meaning of the phrase [due
process]. . . . They did so for a very good reason: they wanted protection against tyranny, wherever and however it might hit, and they
were careful not to limit by exact definition the guarantee of their
liberty."
The Constitution was framed to last centuries, and not to confine a post-industrial society of 250 million people to the specific
horizons of thought existing in a largely rural and agrarian society of
200 years ago. This new assault on due process rejects the spirit of
the framers' passionate faith in the future and in the Constitution's
generality of language and thought to meet changing circumstances.
It strikes me as strangely inconsistent for the same people to speak of
the Constitution as a "living document" on one occasion and then
clamor for "original intent" on another.
Perhaps the most important mechanism for constitutional equilibrium is the separation of powers principle. That too is under
assault. Justice Brandeis very clearly described what the doctrine is
about, and what it is not: "the doctrine of the separation of powers
was adopted by the Convention of 1787 not to promote efficiency in
government operations, but to preclude the arbitrary exercise of
power. The doctrine was not adopted to avoid friction, but by means
of the inevitable friction incident to distributing power, to save the
people from tyranny." In short, the principle is an integral part of
what we call the rule of law. Checks and balances - the hallmark
of separation of powers - were established in order to ensure that
this should be a government of laws and not of men.
Nowhere in the historical and legal writings surrounding the
development of separation of powers is there any hint that criticism
of the decisions of the Supreme Court, the enacted statutes of Congress, or the acts of the President is counterproductive or destructive
of our system. Such criticism is often an essential and wholesome
incident of that "inevitable friction," and the first amendment protects it at almost any cost.
But there is a sharp line between criticism and intentional disregard of the law by a branch of government. Just three months ago,
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the chief law enforcement official of the land declared that decisions
of the Supreme Court "lack the character of law." While he conceded that the parties to the particular case must obey the decision
handed down, he went on to say that the Court's rulings do not
establish a "supreme law of the land" that is binding on all persons
and parts of the government.
The opinion by which he chose to illustrate the point was a
1958 case, signed by all nine Justices, preventing a state's National
Guard from physically barring black students from entering a public
educational facility. The state argued that all branches of government were equally free to interpret the Constitution. The Court
disagreed, citing to the famous 1803 decision of Marbury v.
Madison in which Chief Justice Marshall established the cardinal
principle of judicial review. As Chief Justice Marshall explained, in
the discharge of the various functions of the different branches, a
separate entity not connected with the making of laws or their execution must independently judge how such actions comport with the
Constitution's structure and mandates.
Against the weight of such authority, I find it odd that the
nation's chief law enforcement official should encourage the other
branches of government - or persons beyond the scope of the direct
parties in interest - to substitute their own interpretation of the
Constitution. This is a recipe for chaos, delayed justice, endless litigation, and utter disrespect for the rule of law. This is not to say,
however, that the Supreme Court's interpretations must be accepted
as irrevocable or immutable, or there would be no opportunity for
the Court to change its direction as it did in Brown v. Board of
Education. But the element of intentional disregard of one branch's
duly constituted powers has no place in our system of government.
Unfortunately, this unique view of separation of powers is not
an abstract point expounded in after-dinner speeches. Two years
ago, the then-director of the Office of Management and Budget, acting at the behest of the Attorney General, issued a directive ordering
federal agencies to ignore certain provisions of the Competition in
Contracting Act that the Justice Department believed to be
unconstitutional.
It would have been wholly appropriate for the President to have
vetoed the act on the ground that portions of it were unconstitutional
or on any other grounds. But it is an entirely different matter for
the President to determine that a bill is unconstitutional, sign it into
law, and then refuse to comply with its provisions by directing all
executive branch agencies to defy it - actions that amount to a
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breach of the President's constitutional duty to "take care that the
laws be faithfully executed."
There is no legal or constitutional basis for the President to act
as the arbiter of constitutionality. The authors of our Constitution fresh from the colonial experience with unbridled royal power - set
explicit lines of authority for each branch of government, including
the President.
Under the doctrine of separation of powers, only the courts have
the authority to determine the constitutionality of laws. Indeed, all
laws are presumed valid until the courts decide otherwise. The President, no less than the average citizen, must therefore comply with
them.
That matter has now been resolved, but I regret to say that the
Administration originally contended that the Executive Branch may
unilaterally refuse to comply with a duly enacted and presumptively
valid statute. This is a radical assertion of unbridled executive
authority, and clearly would result in a profound and dangerous
shift in the balance of powers.
One rarely used constitutional mechanism at the core of the separation of powers doctrine is the impeachment process set out in the
Constitution. As you know, twice in the past fifteen years, I have
been called upon as Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee to
preside over impeachment proceedings - once, involving a President, and just recently, a member of the Federal Judiciary. Under
article II of the Constitution, the power of impeachment and removal
is exclusively vested in the Congress - that branch of government
most closely representative of the people.
At the time of the impeachment proceedings involving President
Nixon, there was voiced from many quarters great trepidation that
the system might fail - that it might not be able to survive the
strains of those wrenching deliberations to which all the nation
would bear witness. The participating members of the Committee
came to understand that our constitutional system was being tested,
and therefore, all ideology, party affiliation, and parochial interests
had to be set aside. Our actions on the Judiciary Committee had to
meet standards of only one test, those imposed by the words of article
II of the Constitution (and, of course, I might add parenthetically,
those underlying the preamble - the covenant of trust with the people.) In the end, the social compact was maintained, and the system
survived.
During the summer and fall of 1986, the impeachment process
was again triggered in the first impeachment trial of a federal judi-
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cial official in over fifty years. The impeachment also involved
unique circumstances in our history, a judge who had been convicted
of felonious criminal conduct while in office, who had exhausted all
direct legal appeals in the federal courts and who had been incarcerated for his crimes. Despite these extraordinary circumstances, the
official refused to resign from the bench, and consequently, continued
to receive his judicial salary and other emoluments of office. Understandably, many citizens called for a summary removal from the federal payrolls.
Removal from office, however, was only possible through
impeachment, a procedure purposely made difficult, even unwieldy,
by the framers. They believed that the independence of the judiciary
had to be carefully protected and insulated from political tampering
that would occur if judges served at the pleasure of changing executive officials. To ensure that impeachment was not used as a political
weapon against public officials or otherwise abused, the Constitution
requires that the House of Representatives consider any accusations
of "high crimes and misdemeanors" by federal civil officials and vote
whether a trial on those charges is warranted. If the vote is in favor
of impeachment, then it is left to the Senate to independently conduct
a trial on the charges and vote on the question of removal from
office. Obviously, such an elaborate, even prolonged, procedure
would only be invoked in extraordinary circumstances where a violation of public trust has occurred.
As had occurred during the 1973 impeachment proceedings,
concern was again voiced during the recent impeachment deliberations conducted in September and October of 1986. This time it
centered on how impeachment and removal of a federal judge might
impede or slow down government operations. Some argued that the
House and Senate, with their busy legislative agenda, really had no
time to devote to the "adjudication" of whether "high crimes and
misdemeanors" had been committed by a sitting federal judge within
the meaning of that phrase under article II of the Constitution.
There were calls to delegate the impeachment function to a panel of
judges so that they could conduct a type of "peer review"; there were
other suggestions to simply allow a small number of designated
members of Congress to make all the required findings and spare the
full House and Senate the responsibility of developing a case, hearing the evidence and casting a vote on removal. There was even a
call to delegate Congress' prescribed constitutional role in
impeachment to a non-governmental group of experts. None of these
suggestions for radical surgery of the impeachment process were ac-
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cepted, even at the height of legislative activity at the close of the
99th Congress. In the end, as with the congressional impeachment
actions in 1973, the proceedings reaffirmed both the delicacy and durability - as well as the wisdom - of existing constitutional
procedures.
While the public trust was reaffirmed in the recent impeachment trial, only a short time later it is once again being sorely tested
with revelations of the Iran/Contra arms deal. As a member of the
House Select Committee chosen to investigate this controversy, I am
under constraints in speaking publicly of the facts or direction of the
investigation. But the importance of a thorough investigation cannot
be overemphasized. The larger issues raised by the Iran/Contra
arms affair are not simply the coherency of American foreign policy
in the Middle East or in Central America, though those policies are
of great importance. The fundamental questions posed - just as in
the Watergate crisis - have to do with the executive's misunderstanding of the rule of law that lies at the heart of our American
democracy. Nothing undermines the rule of law more than the desire
of some temporary government - even for purposes believed to be
good - to set aside the law, distort it or ignore it.
Because ours is a system where the ends never justify the
means, I believe the American people - as well as the rest of the
world - look upon the United States as a "nation of laws", in keeping with the preamble's promise of the "establishment of justice."
For all the inconsistencies of policy, for all the arrogance of power
exhibited by certain Administration officials who secreted their
schemes from the open purview of Congress and the American people, the rule of law can in the end restore the people's compact of
trust with the government. That confidence has been impaired, and
cannot be restored by either cover-up or burying our heads in the
sand.
Restoring public trust is only possible if all the facts come out.
Some in this country and outside of it have lamented that America
may become "bogged down" in what they call its "relentless, investigatory ordeal." But such self-examination is what has preserved this
country's commitment to the rule of law. A democratic government is
only as strong as the confidence of the people in the integrity of its
institutions.
At the outset, I mentioned the dovetailing effect of the varied,
but interrelated, purposes encompassed within the preamble's statement of purpose. I have also spoken of certain balancing powers of
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government, which, even though under assault, continue to respond
to any dislocations in the exercise of governmental powers by any
branch of government. But before departing, I feel it incumbent to
move from principles and statements of intent to the actual state of
the social compact today.
What is government doing now to provide for the "general welfare" and "secure the blessings of liberty" for all Americans? If the
social compact in practice does not serve each of us, irrespective of
race, religion and class, then, by definition, it is a limited guarantee,
and unworthy of the document which launched this republic 200
years ago.
In assessing the situation, I must admit to being slightly confounded by certain statements and policies that I have recently noted.
Today, there is much talk of the fact that we live in an interdependent world, undergoing rapid technological and economic change.
We all have expressed worry to ourselves and others that America
may not be saving or investing enough for the future, that we are
helplessly watching as jobs are destroyed and communities uprooted
because of a failure to be competitive in the international
marketplace.
And yet, even as these concerns are voiced, the economic and
fiscal priorities of the Administration proceed as if these concerns are
irrelevant, or of only secondary importance. For six years, the
Administration has not offered a balanced budget - neither in the
bottom-line budget figures nor in balanced priorities.
How - if competitiveness and productivity are the gateways to
the 1990's and beyond - can education, research and development,
the rebuilding of the nation's infrastructure, and the modernization
of heavy industry be relegated to such low priority in the budgets we
have seen sent up to Congress in the past six years?
Psychologists have coined the phrase "cognitive dissonance" to
characterize that state of mind where we say one thing about what
we believe in, but proceed to act in a manner inconsistent with those
stated values - all the while oblivious to the contradiction in action
and thought.
Are we, as a nation, moving on a path of contradictory values
and actions? I have my fears. America's standing in the world
depends not only on its military strength, but also on its capacity to
make social and economic choices to ensure that we remain a truly
democratic, people-caring nation. But, if we rely solely on missiles
and warheads, and neglect the other challenges at home, we will
have embarked on a formula for the making of a second-class world
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power.
As I study the new budget offered by the Administration for
fiscal year 1988, the President proposes another Pentagon funding
increase of three percent after inflation. This comes after the defense
budget has already increased 117 percent since 1980. Hardest hit in
the new proposal are education, health and medical programs. I
must ask in this year of bicentennial, if we accept such priorities, are
we really living up to the preamble's prescription for balance, and
the pledge of trust in meeting the needs of the people and "securing
the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity?" Are we living
up to our compact with the people?
Does not the social compact include the right of all Americans
to share in some measure of economic well-being in their personal
lives? Do we simply forget about the homeless, saying there is nothing we can do because they fail to have a fixed address for mail? Do
we tell our youth and their families that they may have to defer or
completely miss the opportunity to pursue the avenues of higher education because of financial barriers? What about scientific research
and development? What about the medical research challenges of
cancer and AIDS facing our society? And is the message to our elderly that, even if you give forty or fifty years of productive service to
community and country, it is your problem alone to cope with catastrophic illnesses in your later years? Isn't the government "in
mingling diverse purposes in due proportion" - as Madison put it
- responsible for confronting these issues?
The answers to these questions are indeed crucial for the "general welfare" and the "blessings of liberty" guaranteed for each of
us. But they are just as essential for the collective policy of state the government - to answer as well. The covenant of trust requires
no less.
The Constitution is a precious document. It has passed from
generation to generation. As its beneficiaries, we - all of us - have
an obligation to act as its trustees - guarantors - of this system
• . . to guard jealously the rights and protections it promises . . . to
secure the blessings of liberty for all and ensure that those rights and
protections are neither destroyed nor chipped away.
Benjamin Franklin long ago reminded all of us thai preservation of our form of government depended on our constant vigilance.
Franklin one time was asked what kind of government we had, a
republic or a monarchy. Franklin replied, "a republic, if you can
keep it."
In this bicentennial year, let us all pledge to preserve the ideals
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on which our nation was founded. Let us leave the Constitution for
our inheritors as unimpaired as it was left to 'us. Let us assure all
citizens that our fundamental law, our bedrock principles, our
system and its institutions will endure. In this way, we - just as
those who came before us - will reaffirm the compact with the
people.

